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Abstract
We develop the theory of demand for commodities and assets facing incompletely insurable uncer-
tainty. First, a Slutsky matrix decomposes into substitution and income eﬀects the derivative of demand
with respect to prices and yield structure. Next, we identify the Slutsky matrix’s properties.
The Slutsky matrix can be perturbed arbitrarily, subject only to preserving these properties, by
perturbing the underlying utility’s Hessian, while ﬁxing point demand and marginal utility. The key
result identiﬁes these Slutsky perturbations. For arguing genericity, it is an alternative to Citanna, Kajii
and Villanacci’s (1998) ﬁrst-order conditions approach.
The latter results extend to incomplete markets Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980), who intro-
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
We develop the theory of demand for commodities and assets facing incompletely insurable uncertainty,
given commodity prices, arbitrage-free yield structures, and contingent incomes.
First, a Slutsky matrix decomposes into substitution and income eﬀects the derivative of demand with
respect to prices and yield structure, extending Fischer (1972) to multiple commodities.
Next, we identify the Slutsky matrix’s properties.
The Slutsky matrix can be perturbed arbitrarily, subject only to preserving these properties, by perturb-
ing the underlying utility’s Hessian, while ﬁxing point demand and marginal utility.
The key result identiﬁes these Slutsky perturbations, via linear constraints deﬁned by prices and the yield
structure (theorem 2). We also spell out the identiﬁcation after omission of markets due to Walras’ law and
price normalization.
The latter two results extend to incomplete markets Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1980), who intro-
duced Slutsky perturbations.
Finally, we include an algorithm that speeds up the computation of Slutsky matrices.
For arguing genericity, Slutsky perturbations are an alternative to Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci’s (1998)
ﬁrst-order conditions approach. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) were the ﬁrst to apply Slutsky
perturbations to the study of generic Pareto improvements with incomplete markets. Since they allowed
the central planner to decide the agents’ asset portfolios, they did not need to go beyond perturbations to
the Slutsky matrices of demand in spot markets. To show why weaker interventions may improve welfare,
such as anonymous taxes and changes in asset payoﬀs, it became necessary to take into account how agents’
portfolio adjustments cause a further price adjustment. Naturally, this required perturbing demand in asset
markets as well, not just spot markets. The lack of an extension of Slutsky perturbations to incomplete
markets remained an obstacle for over a decade1, until a breakthrough by Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci
(1998), who circumvented it by analyzing the agents’ ﬁrst order conditions. Researchers have extended the
theory of generic Pareto improvements with incomplete markets to many policies by applying this ﬁrst-order
1The exception is Elul (1995).
1approach; see Cass and Citanna (1998), Citanna, Polemarchakis, and Tirelli (2003), and Bisin et al. (2001).
We extend Slutsky perturbations to incomplete markets, to recover the advantages of the original demand-
based approach to generic improvements. First, analyzing generic welfare requires drastically fewer equations
when exploiting the envelope formula, instead of the (more numerous) ﬁrst-order conditions and budget
identities generating it. Perturbations are to the objects in the envelope formula; ﬁrst order conditions and
budget identities completely vanish. Genericity arguments need only invoke the identiﬁcation of Slutsky
perturbations, rather than literally perturb the utilities’ Hessians—utilities no longer explicitly appear in the
paper. Second, computing the welfare impact of interventions requires knowledge by the policymaker of
the derivative of aggregate, instead of individual, demand. In the ﬁrst-order approach, he needs to know
the derivative of every individual’s demand, i.e. the second derivative of every individual’s utility. Third,
explanations become more intuitive with the familiar language of demand theory than with the language of
submersions.
The paper continues as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes demand for commodities and assets in incomplete
markets, and lists the basic properties of neoclassical demand. Section 3 deﬁnes the Slutsky matrix. Section
4f o c u s e so naﬁxed demand, presenting the properties every Slutsky matrix must satisfy. It also decomposes
the derivative of demand into income and substitution eﬀects, records the envelope property, and speeds up
the computation of the Slutsky matrix by a recursion. Section 5 focuses on generic demand, deﬁning Slutsky
perturbations, identifying them by linear constraints, and discussing the implications of Walras’ law and
price normalization. Section 6 contains the proofs.
2D e m a n d
The household knows the present state of nature, denoted 0, but is uncertain as to which among s =1 ,...,S
nature will reveal in period 1. It consumes commodities c =1 ,...,C in the present and future, and invests
in assets j =1 ,...,J in the present only. Markets assign to the household an income w ∈ R
S+1
++ ,t o
commodity c ap r i c e p·c ∈ R
S+1
++ ,a n dt oa s s e t j a yield Wj ∈ RS+1.W e c a l l(pc)C
1 = p =( ps) the
2spot prices and (Wj)J
1 = W =( Ws) the yield structure. The set of budget variables
b ≡ (p,W,w) ∈ B ≡ RC∗
++ × RJ×S+1 × R
S+1
++
has some nonempty, open B0 ⊂ B as a distinguished subset, C∗ = C(S +1 ) .
Demand for commodities and assets is a function d =( x,y):B0 → RC∗
+ × RJ.I t s a t i s ﬁes Walras’





0 x − W0y = w with the useful notation
[p] ≡
⎡








⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
C∗×S+1
The interpretation is that, faced with spot prices p and yield structure W, the household modiﬁes
its income w to w + W0y(p,W,w) by investing in portfolio y(p,W,w), ultimately ﬁnancing its state
contingent consumption x(p,W,w). Here, a yield structure speciﬁes for each asset j that a buyer is to
collect, a seller to deliver, a value Wj
s in state s, and a portfolio y ∈ RJ speciﬁes how much of each asset
to buy (yj ≥ 0)o rs e l l( yj ≤ 0), hence yielding W0y.F o r a d i ﬀerent emphasis, we may view the assets as
having present price q ≡− W0 and future yield W1 ≡ (Ws)s>0.
2.1 Neoclassical demand
For b =( p,W,w) ∈ B,t h eﬁnanceable bundles are
X(b)={x ∈ RC∗
+ | [p]
0 x − w ∈ spanW0}
Each x ∈ X(b) implies a ﬁnancing y, [p]
0 x − w = W0y, which is unique if W has linearly independent
rows: y = y(x,b).G i v e n a u t i l i t y f u n c t i o nu : RC∗




3has a unique solution x(b).T h e n neoclassical demand at b ∈ B0 is deﬁned to be d(b) ≡ (x(b),y(x(b),b)).
The following remark hinges on X(b) depending on W0 only through its span, and on w only through
the component that is orthogonal to spanW 0.
Remark 1 Suppose B0 is X-closed: b ∈ B0,b∈ B,X(b)=X(b0) ⇒ b0 ∈ B0.
• Walras’ relation [p]
0 x(p,W,w) − W0y(p,W,w)=w
• Revealed yield preference If ∆ ∈ spanW 0 with w + ∆ À 0,t h e n
i) x(p,W,w + ∆)=x(p,W,w)
ii) λ(p,W,w + ∆)=λ(p,W,w)
where Du0(x(p,W,w)) = [p]λ, should it have a solution, uniquely deﬁnes λ(p,W,w) ∈ RS+1.
• Homogeneity x(p,W,w)=x(p, ˜ W,w) if spanW0 = span ˜ W0.
We now recall a subset B0 ⊂ B for which x(b) exists, is unique and interior. Existence obtains if
utility is continuous and X(b) compact; it is well known that X(p,W,w) is compact if and only if W
is arbitrage-free, Wλ =0 for some λ ∈ R
S+1
++ . Uniqueness and interiority obtain if utility is strictly
quasiconcave in RC∗
++ and boundary averse, u(x) >u (˜ x) whenever x ∈ RC∗
++, ˜ x ∈ ∂RC∗
+ , thanks to the
convexity of X(b). In sum, neoclassical demand d =( x,y):B0 → RC∗
++ × RJ is deﬁned on
B0 ≡ {(p,W,w) ∈ B | W has linearly independent rows, is arbitrage-free}
given the hypotheses on utility of continuity, strict quasiconcavity in RC∗
++, and boundary aversion.
3 Slutsky matrices
Assumption 1 Debreu’s setting for u:
iu is continuous, u is Cr≥2 in RC∗
++
ii Du(x) À 0 for x À 0
iii D2u(x) is negative deﬁnite on Du(x)⊥ for x À 0
iv u(x) > sup∂RC∗
+ u for x À 0
4Debreu’s special setting means the above strengthened to ”D2u(x) is negative deﬁnite for x À 0.”
All three hypotheses assumed to deﬁne interior neoclassical demand are present, save for strict quasi-
concavity in RC∗
++, which is implied by the ﬁrst and third ones in Debreu’s setting.
Proposition 1 Debreu’s setting implies d =( x,y):B0 → RC∗
++ × RJ is Cr−1.
Proof. By deﬁnition neoclassical demand is the solution to
max u(x) subject to x ≥ 0,[p]
0 x − W0y = w (max)
which exists, is unique, and interior. For now suppose (x,y) ∈ RC∗
++×RJ is neoclassical demand at b ∈ B0
iﬀ there is λ ∈ R
S+1
++ (necessarily unique) such that
F(x,y,λ;b) ≡
⎡





0 x + W0y + w
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
=0 (F)
Then (x,y,λ) is a Cr−1 implicit function of b ∈ B02,i f H ≡ Dx,y,λF is surjective:
H =
⎡

































Invertibility follows easily from (F), Debreu’s third condition, and W0s linearly independent rows.3
We verify the above equivalence for (x,y) ∈ RC∗
++ × RJ.I f i t s o l v e s ( m a x ) , t h e r e i s λ ∈ R
S+1
+ such
that (F), since the constraint qualiﬁcation holds with linear constraints. (Independently of concavity!) So
λ ∈ R
S+1
++ by Debreu’s second condition. Conversely, if (F) with λ À 0 then (x,y) solves (max):
If it did not there would be ˜ x, ˜ y with u(˜ x) >u (x) (so ˜ x À 0 by boundary aversion and x À 0)
and [p]
0 ˜ x − W0˜ y = w. By the strict quasiconcavity in RC∗
++ u(˜ x(t)) >u (x) for all t ∈ (0,1],w h e r e
2B0 is open in B with the product topology. For suppose W has linearly independent rows and Wλ =0∈ RJ,λ ∈ R
s+1
++ .
Then some open neighborhood O of W preserves the linear independence and admits, by the implicit function theorem, a
smooth function λ : O → Rs+1
++ solving ˜ Wλ( ˜ W)=0 .
3The letter ”H” alludes to the Hessian D2
x,y,λL of L = u(x) − λ0([p]0 x − W0y − w).
5˜ x(t) ≡ t˜ x +( 1− t)x, while still ˜ x(t) À 0,[p]
0 ˜ x(t) − W0˜ y(t)=w with ˜ y(t) obviously deﬁned. Writing
∆t ≡ ˜ x(t) − x in a second order Taylor expansion about t =0 ,






The orthogonality Du(x)∆t = λ
0[p]0∆t = λ
0W0(˜ y(t) − y)=0 implies ∆0
tD2u(x)∆t < 0 by assumption on
D2u,s o u(˜ x(t)) − u(x) < 0 for all t ≈ 0,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .









⎦,t h eSlutsky matrices (Slutsky)
To keep track, S,c are symmetric of dimensions C∗ + J,S +1 ,a n d m is C∗ + J × S +1 .W e v i e wρ
as playing the role of prices, since ρ = p0 = p if J = S =0(sole budget constraint).
Having deﬁned Slutsky matrices, we develop neoclassical demand theory in two parts. First is demand
for a ﬁxed utility: the Slutsky decomposition, the properties of Slutsky matrices, their computation, and the
envelope property. Next is demand for a generic utility: identifying the range of perturbations of Slutsky
matrices that arise from perturbations of the Hessian of utility.
4 Fixed neoclassical demand
4.1 Slutsky decomposition
We decompose demand into substitution and income eﬀects, generalizing Gottardi and Hens (1999) to
multiple commodities and to including the derivative with respect to asset payoﬀs. Diﬀerentiating the




































⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
C∗×C∗
Λ ≡ [λ0IJ : ... : λsIJ]J×J(S+1) Ψ ≡
⎡






⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
S+1×(S+1)J
In diﬀerentiating, we vectorized p,W as
⎡




































⎦ + mΨ with Dwd = m (decomposition)
so that m is the marginal propensity to demand; also, Dwλ = c.
Let us interpret the decomposition as substitution and income eﬀects. The second summands are clearly
income eﬀects: for Dpd, the value of demanding x is [x]0p, so a change in price of ˙ p implies a change in
relative income of −[x]0 ˙ p, which implies a change in demand of −m[x]0 ˙ p;f o r DWd, the value of demanding
y is W0y = ΨW, and likewise. The ﬁrst summands are substitution eﬀects in this sense. Suppose, given a
small change in p,W, that we compensate the household so it can just ﬁnance the (x,y) it is demanding.
Then its compensated income and demand would be w(p,W) ≡ [p]0x−W0y,dcom(p,W) ≡ d(p,W,w(p,W)),
and the substitution eﬀects be Dpdcom,D Wdcom. Computing them,

















using the chain rule, (decomposition), and Dwd = m. Hence the substitution eﬀects are the ﬁrst summands.
We paraphrase the decomposition to stress the parallel with the traditional one, and to obtain a convenient



















7Concatenating the expressions for Dpd,Dqd,










Dp,qd = SL+ − m˜ d0 where ˜ d ≡ [[x]0 : Ψ0]0 (GE)
The eﬀect on demand of price changes splits into substitution and income eﬀects, the latter being the product
of the marginal propensity to demand with demand itself. (The notation ”˜ d”e x p r e s s e s t h a td,[[x]0 : Ψ0]0
contain the same information, diﬀering only in its display.)
4.2 Envelope property
Indirect utility v : B0 → R,v(b) ≡ u(x(b)) is derived from demand; inversely, according to the envelope
property, neoclassical demand is derived from indirect utility:
Proposition 2 Indirect utility is Cr−1 in Debreu’s setting, and its gradient Dbv equals
Dpv = −λ
0[x]0 DWv = λ
0Ψ Dwv = λ
0
Thus Dpsv = −λsx0
s,D Wsv = λsy0.
Proof. v is Cr−1 since u,x are, in Debreu’s setting. By the chain rule and (F) Dbv = Du · Dbx =
λ
0[p]0 · [Dpx : DWx : Dwx]=∗.D i ﬀerentiating Walras’ relation [p]0x = W0y + w with respect to
p :[ p]0Dpx +[ x]0 = W0Dpy
W :[ p]0DWx = W0DWy + Ψ
w :[ p]0Dwx = W0Dwy + I
Inserting this and λ
0W0 =0 from (F), ∗ = λ
0[−[x]:Ψ : I].
84.3 The Slutsky list of properties
What properties do the Slutsky matrices H−1 have? Convenient notations are





































⎦ and ˜ H(D) ≡ H(M(D)) (functions)
Of course, in (H) we have H = ˜ H(D) |D=D2u, where D ∈ RC∗×C∗
. The purpose of ˜ H is to study how the
Slutsky matrices H−1 depend on D2u.
Toward the properties of H−1,w et a k ea sg i v e ns o m e µ ∈ RS+1 with Wµ=0 . In Debreu’s setting, it
corresponds to the µ = λ in (F); in Debreu’s special setting, to µ =0 . The point is that µ is unrelated
to the second derivative D = D2u.










for some S,m,c satisfying the
S ρ0S =0 ,S is negative deﬁnite on ρ⊥, symmetric
m ρ0m = IX W 0 =0
cc W 0 =0 ,c is negative deﬁnite on kerX⊥ ∩ µ⊥, symmetric4
(Slutsky list)
Conversely, if (Slutsky list), then Smc is invertible, with inverse ˜ H(D),f o rs o m e D that is negative
deﬁnite on ([p]µ)⊥ and symmetric.
We stress that the Slutsky list of properties is exhaustive, in that it recovers all properties of the one
object (D2u)d e ﬁning the Slutsky matrices H−1 = ˜ H(D2u)−1, namely (iii) in Debreu’s setting. Any other
property of Slutsky matrices must follow from this list; for example, YW0 = −I from ρ0m = I,XW0 =0 .
4It is easy to show that ker X⊥ ∩ µ⊥ = W⊥ ∩ µ⊥.
9Note that revealed yield preference is manifested inﬁnitesimally in XW0 =0 ,cW0 =0 ,s i n c et h i s
results from diﬀerentiating (i,ii) in remark 1 with respect to ∆ ∈ spanW0.
4.4 Computation of Slutsky matrices


















⎦ ⇒ H−1 =
⎡




−X0 −Y 0 −c
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(*)
To keep track, the square A,B,c are symmetric of dimensions C∗,J,S+1,a n d PC∗×J,X C∗×S+1,Y J×S+1.
Algorithm 1 H−1 exists if D is negative deﬁnite, and is recursively computable if D is symmetric:
D−1
Φ ≡ [p]0D−1[p] auxiliary matrix
B =( WΦ−1W0)−1
Y = −BWΦ−1 c = Φ−1 − Φ−1W0BWΦ−1
P = −D−1[p]Y 0 X = D−1[p]c
A =( I − X[p]0)D−1
Computing D−1 is the most expensive step, which is cheaper with state separable utility,
u(x)=a(u0(x0),...,uS(xS)) for some a,(us)s
because then D is block diagonal and its inverse too
D =
⎡




















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⇒ Φ is diagonal
The next properties of the Slutsky matrices must, by theorem 1, already follow from the Slutsky list.
10Corollary 1 Fix D as above. Then B is negative deﬁnite, kerP =k e r Y 0 and rankY = J,
kerc =k e rX, c is negative deﬁnite on
¡

















meaning that, for marginal income ˙ w ∈ spanΦc,m a r g i n a ld e m a n d m ˙ w is as if asset markets were absent.
5 Generic neoclassical demand
Equilibrium theory goes beyond demand theory by adding market clearing. Policy theory then adds some
policy parameters. By implicitly diﬀerentiating market clearing, the envelope property at once gives a
formula for the derivative of equilibrium welfare with respect to the policy parameters. Inevitably, this
formula contains the Slutsky matrices. So the generic welfare impact of policy is inevitably tied to the
generic Slutsky matrices, which we therefore seek to identify.
5.1 Slutsky perturbations
A perturbation of the Slutsky matrices is a point ∇∈RdimH. A Slutsky perturbation is one arising
from a perturbation of the Hessian of utility. More exactly, recall Slutsky matrices are H−1 with H =
˜ H(D) |D=D2u . By continuity of ˜ H, ˜ H(D)−1 exists for all close enough D ≈ D2u. If D is symmetric
then we call the diﬀerence ∇ = ˜ H(D)−1 −H−1 a Slutsky perturbation. With this perturbation Slutsky
matrices go from H−1 to H−1 + ∇, and ∇ arises from a perturbation from D2u to D.





˙ S − ˙ m




and identify a Slutsky perturbation with a triple ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c. Our main goal is to identify Slutsky perturbations,
11without reference to the inversion deﬁning them, in terms of individual constraints on ∇ :
on ˙ S ρ0 ˙ S =0 and ˙ S is symmetric
on ˙ m ρ0 ˙ m =0 and ˙ XW0 =0
on ˙ c ˙ cW0 =0 and ˙ c is symmetric
(constraints)
Each of these three independent linear constraints is satisﬁed by zero, 0= ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c.
Theorem 2 (Slutsky perturbations identiﬁed) Given u in Debreu’s setting and b in B0, consider
the Slutsky matrices H−1. Every small enough Slutsky perturbation ∇ satisﬁes (constraints). Conversely,
every small enough perturbation ∇ that satisﬁes (constraints) is Slutsky: H−1+∇ is the inverse of ˜ H(D)
for some D that is negative deﬁnite on Du(x(b))⊥ and symmetric. (Negative deﬁnite, given u in
Debreu’s special setting.)
Thus Slutsky perturbations are characterized as those that satisfy (constraints), aﬀecting S,m,c simul-
taneously or separately. A proof of theorem from theorem 1 is trivial , if we appeal to
Lemma 1 (Stability) Fix a dimension 0 < dim ≤ C∗ for the Grassmanian GC∗,dim. Suppose continuous
functions D : K → RC∗×C∗
,S : K → GC∗,dim.I f D(x) is negative deﬁnite on σ(x),t h e n D(˜ x) is
negative deﬁnite on σ(˜ x),f o ra l ln e a r b y ˜ x ≈ x.
Proof. Am a t r i x D is negative deﬁnite on a nonzero subspace σ iﬀ maxz∈σ∗ z0Dz < 0,b yc o m p a c t n e s s
of σ∗ ≡ {z ∈ σ | z0z =1 }.B y h y p o t h e s i s , ²(x) ≡ maxz∈σ∗(x) z0D(x)z<0, and by the maximum principle
²(·) is continuous, so ²(˜ x) < 0 is an open neighborhood of x. (To apply the principle, note σ∗(·) is a
continuous, nonempty, compact valued correspondence and (x,z) 7→ z0D(x)z a continuous function.)
Proof. of theorem 2. Clearly ∇ = ˜ H(D)−1 −H−1 satisﬁes (constraints) if both H−1, ˜ H(D)−1 satisfy
(Slutsky list). This hypothesis in turn holds, by the ﬁrst part of theorem 1, if D2u,D are (1) symmetric
and (2) negative deﬁnite on ([p]µ)⊥. These conditions hold for D2u in Debreu’s setting; by deﬁnition of
a Slutsky perturbation (1) holds for D, and by stability (σ ≡ ([p]µ)⊥) so does (2), if it is small enough.
Conversely, suppose ∇ satisﬁes (constraints). By the ﬁr s tp a r to ft h e o r e m1 H−1 satisﬁes (Slutsky
list), so clearly H−1 + ∇ satisﬁes (Slutsky list)—save perhaps for the deﬁniteness statements, which by
12stability (σ = ρ⊥,ker(X + ˙ X)⊥ ∩µ⊥) still hold if ∇ is small enough. Therefore H−1 +∇ is invertible, by
the converse part of theorem 1, with inverse ˜ H(D) for some D that is negative deﬁnite on ([p]µ)⊥ and
symmetric. Thus ˜ H(D)−1 = H−1 + ∇ and ∇ is a Slutsky perturbation.
In sum, the range of ∇ = ˜ H(D)−1−H−1 as D varies symmetrically is the ∇ satisfying (constraints).
5.2 Quadratic perturbations
A Hessian perturbation is a symmetric point ∆ ∈ RC∗
. We just saw which perturbations H−1 → H−1+∇
of the Slutsky matrices arise from Hessian perturbations D2u → D = D2u+∆. Now we recall a well-known
”fact” that every such ∆ arises from a quadratic perturbation of utility preserving Debreu’s setting and
x(b) as neoclassical demand.
Deﬁnition 1 A quadratic perturbation of utility at x ∈ RC∗
++ is a pair (ω,∆) consisting of a Cr≥2
weight function ω : RC∗
+ → [0,1] that equals unity in a neighborhood of x and has compact support
in RC∗
++, and of a symmetric matrix ∆ of dimension C∗.I t o p e r a t e s o n f u n c t i o n s RC∗
+ → R as
u 7→ u(ω,∆)(x) ≡ u(x)+
ω(x)
2 (x − x)0∆(x − x).
Proposition 3 (Hessian perturbations identiﬁed) If u is in Debreu’s setting, so is u(ω,∆t) for all
small enough support(ω),t,a n dt h e n x is the u−demand at b iﬀ it is the u(ω,∆t)−demand at b.L a s t
but not least, D2u(ω,∆t)(x)=D2u(x)+∆t,s ot h a t ∂
∂t |t=0 D2u(ω,∆t)(x)=∆.
Conclusion 1 Suppose u belongs in Debreu’s setting and b in B0, and consider the Slutsky matrices
S,m,c at x(b). Then any small enough perturbation to them that satisﬁes (constraints), and none other,
we can rationalize by a quadratic perturbation u(ω,∆) of u such that u(ω,∆) preserves Debreu’s setting
and demand du(ω,∆)(b)=du(b) at b, and has the perturbed S,m,c for its Slutsky matrices.
An argument about generic policy can exchange weighty luggage—quadratic perturbations of utility, ﬁrst
order conditions, and budget identities—for the lighter identiﬁcation.
135.3 Slutsky perturbations as a transversality tool in equilibrium
Here we describe the range of Slutsky perturbations, identiﬁed in theorem 2, once the Slutsky matrices have
been trimmed due to Walras’ law and to a price normalization.
Walras’ identity implies Walras’ law,t h a t S +1 of the market clearing equations are redundant at
equilibrium, where household incomes wh =[ p]0eh arise from endowments eh ∈ RC∗
+ . For asset market






















=0 for every state s ≥ 0. Since psC > 0, it follows that













=0 , the underbar denoting omission of the last coordinate.
If the future yields s>0 are real,s a y Wj
s = p0
saj
s for some real asset aj
s ∈ RC, then no equilibrium
allocation is lost by the price normalization psC =1 for every s ≥ 0. For in equilibrium no-arbitrage
state prices µ ∈ RS
++ exist, W0 = −q = −W1µ, making the set X(b) of ﬁnanceable bundles homogeneous
of degree zero in price levels γ ∈ R
S+1
++ → ˜ ps = γps, in that X(b)=X(˜ b) for ˜ b =
³









where ˜ W1 has ˜ Wj
s =˜ p0
saj
s. So the normalization γs = 1
psC leaves neoclassical
demand, hence the equilibrium allocation, intact.
The relevance of Walras’ law and the price normalization is that equilibrium with real assets is described
by as many equations of demand and supply as equilibrating prices, C∗ − (S +1 )=( S +1 ) ( C − 1) + J.
The diﬀerential (dp,dq) of equilibrium prices with respect to perturbations of the economy, say, arising

















































provided ∆ is invertible. We can compute the Jacobian ∆ from the above Slutsky decompositions








h) depend on (p,q). In
turn, the Jacobian depends on the Slutsky matrices S
h,m h,c h through the Slutsky decompositions, the
dimensions being trimmed by Walras’ law and the price normalization: (S +1 ) ( C − 1) + J squared,
(S +1)(C −1)+J ×(S +1 ), and (S +1)×(S +1 ). The values of the missing coordinates are recoverable
from the Slutsky properties ρ0S =0 ,S is symmetric, ρ0m = I. Thus at an equilibrium where ∆ is
invertible, (dp,dq) exists and depends on the trimmed Slutsky matrices.
Any question about the equilibrium welfare impact of perturbations of the economy involves the diﬀeren-
tial (dp,dq), owing to the envelope property, proposition 2. Often, the answer to such a question is true only
generically in the economy’s utility parameters. Arguing such an answer involves the transversality theorem
(see Mas-Colell I.2.2). Verifying the rank hypothesis of this theorem then involves the derivative of (dp,dq)
with respect to utility parameters; recalling how (dp,dq) depends on the Slutsky matrices, this involves
the derivative of the Slutsky matrices S,m,c with respect to utility parameters. If the utility parameters
index quadratic perturbations, as in deﬁnition 1, then the range of this latter derivative (and this is all that
is needed to verify the rank hypothesis) is identiﬁed by theorem 2 as the Slutsky perturbations. In sum,
Slutsky perturbations allows us to argue properties of equilibrium that are generic with respect to utilities,
without having to specify which quadratic perturbations of utility lead to the Slutsky perturbations.
Since verifying the transversality hypothesis involves trimmed Slutsky perturbations ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c, we describe
the correspondence between trimmed Slutsky perturbations ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c ≈ 0 and Slutsky perturbations. The
usefulness of this correspondence is that in proofs we can invoke such ˙ S, ˙ m, ˙ c and know that they correspond
to quadratic perturbations of utility. The point is that all the information lost by trimming is recoverable
from the Slutsky properties (constraints).
15Proposition 4 Fix a small enough square matrix ˙ S ∈ R[(S+1)(C−1)+J]2
. Then it is the trimmed ˙ S from
a Slutsky perturbation iﬀ ˙ S is symmetric.
Proof. Suppose ˙ S is from a Slutsky perturbation. Then by theorem 2 it satisﬁes the constraints
(constraints), hence is symmetric, so the trimmed submatrix ˙ S is symmetric.
Conversely, suppose ˙ S is symmetric. We now show how the constraints (constraints), namely ρ0 ˙ S =0






˙ A ˙ P




















˙ A[p] − ˙ PW





˙ A[p]= ˙ PW
[p]0 ˙ P = W0 ˙ B
We see that [p]0 ˙ P = W0 ˙ B determines S +1 rows of ˙ P, for
[p]0 ˙ P =[ p]0
⎡


















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(Superscripts index sets of rows.) That is, the last row of each ˙ Ps is determined by the equation p0
s ˙ Ps =
10
sW0 ˙ B, and recoverable from it in conjunction with the other rows, i.e. with ˙ P. Further, we see that
16˙ A[p]= ˙ PW determines S +1 columns of ˙ A, for
˙ A[p]=
∙










⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
(Subscripts index sets of columns.)That is, the last column of each ˙ As is determined by the equation
˙ Asps = ˙ PWs, and recoverable from it in conjunction with the other columns, i.e. with ˙ A. This shows
uniqueness, in that ˙ S ≡ ˙ A, ˙ P, ˙ B is the image of at most one ˙ S ≡ ˙ A, ˙ P, ˙ B. Now we show existence. Given
˙ S ≡ ˙ A, ˙ P, ˙ B, use the equations (1) p0
s ˙ Ps =1 0
sW0 ˙ B to deﬁne S +1 extra rows for ˙ P and hence to deﬁne
˙ P,and (2) ˙ Asps,−C +aspsC = ˙ PWs to deﬁne S +1 extra columns a0,...,aS ∈ RC∗−(S+1). Then for each
s extend ˙ A
s
s ∈ RC−1×C−1 to ˙ As














where xs ∈ R is to be determined. This is symmetric because by assumption ˙ S hence ˙ A hence ˙ A
s
s is.
Since already ˙ Asps,−C +aspsC = ˙ PWs, to show ˙ Asps = ˙ PW s it suﬃces to pick xs as the unique solution
of a0
sps,−C + xspsC =1 0
sC ˙ PWs. This extension of ˙ S ≡ ˙ A, ˙ P, ˙ B to ˙ S ≡ ˙ A, ˙ P, ˙ B by construction satisﬁes
the constraints (constraints) and so by theorem 2 is a Slutsky perturbation.








⎦ ∈ R(S+1)(C−1)+J×(S+1). Then it is the trimmed
˙ m from a Slutsky perturbation iﬀ ˙ XW0 =0 .
Proof. Suppose ˙ m is from a Slutsky perturbation. Then by theorem 2 it satisﬁes the constraints
(constraints), in particular ˙ XW0 =0 , hence ˙ XW0 =0 .
Conversely, suppose ˙ XW0 =0 . We now show how the constraints (constraints), namely ρ0 ˙ m =0 and
˙ XW0 =0 , imply a unique ˙ m from a Slutsky perturbation. Indeed, 0=ρ0 ˙ m =[ p]0 ˙ X − W0 ˙ Y states
[p]0 ˙ X =[ p]0
⎡


















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
= W0 ˙ Y
17so that the last row of each ˙ Xs is determined by the equation p0
s ˙ Xs =1 0
sW0 ˙ Y,and recoverable from it in
conjunction with the other rows, i.e. with ˙ X. This shows uniqueness, in that ˙ m ≡ ˙ X, ˙ Y is the image of
at most one ˙ m ≡ ˙ X, ˙ Y.Now we show existence. Given ˙ m ≡ ˙ X, ˙ Y,use the equation p0
s ˙ Xs =1 0
sW0 ˙ Y to
deﬁne S +1 extra rows for ˙ X and hence to deﬁne ˙ X.
To conclude, it is possible to argue transversality with Slutsky perturbations, which appear naturally
in verifying the rank hypothesis of the transversality theorem whenever the underlying system of equations
involves the diﬀerential (dp,dq), such as in equilibrium welfare analysis. In the case of real assets, the
computations facing us involve trimmed Slutsky matrices. The previous two propositions show how to
perturb these trimmed Slutsky matrices in a way compatible with unique Slutsky perturbations, hence with
local Hessian perturbations of utility.
6P r o o f s
6.1 The Slutsky properties










(I) the relationship between M,ρ
(II) M = M(D) for some D
(III) D is negative deﬁnite on ([p]µ)⊥5
Equivalence 1 Fix a matrix ρ.6 Suppose









5We will take µ = λ or 0, according as we are in Debreu’s setting or Debreu’s special setting. (III) says ”D is negative
deﬁnite” if µ =0 .
6This does not have to be the particular one in (H).








for some S,m,c satisfying




Conversely, suppose (I’). Then (1’) is invertible, with inverse (1), for some M satisfying (I).










ρ1 = ﬁrst C∗ rows of ρ
ρ2 =l a s t J rows of ρ
Equivalence 2 Fix ρ with no kernel. Suppose (I) and consider the m,c implied by Equivalence 1. If
M(D)0s last J rows and columns are zero (II)
then
Xρ0
2 =0 Y ρ0
2 = Ic ρ0
2 =0 (II’)
Conversely, suppose (I’) and consider the M implied by Equivalence 1. If (II’) then (II) for some D.
Lastly, Y ρ0
2 = I is redundant in (II’) if ρ2 has linearly independent rows.
Equivalence 3 Fix ρ with no kernel and ρ2µ =0 .S u p p o s e ( I ) a n d c o n s i d e r t h e m,c implied by
Equivalence 1; suppose (II). If
D is negative deﬁnite on (ρ1µ)⊥ (III)
then
c is negative deﬁnite on kerX⊥ ∩ µ⊥ (III’)
Conversely, suppose (I’) and consider the M implied by Equivalence 1; suppose (II’) and consider the
solution to M = M(D) implied by Equivalence 2. If (III’) then (III).
19We now apply the Equivalences to our particular case:
M = M(D2u) ρ1 =[ p] ρ2 = −W (particular)
Lemma 2 Suppose M = M(D) with D negative deﬁnite on (ρ1µ)⊥,w h e r e ρ2µ =0 and ρ2 has











Suppose [a0 : b0] ∈ ρ⊥,t h a ti s , a0ρ1 = −b0ρ2. Claim: a ∈ (ρ1µ)⊥.F o ra0ρ1µ = −b0ρ2µ =0 c So a0Da < 0
unless a =0⇒ b0ρ2 =0⇒ b =0 given the linearly independent rows.
Proof. of theorem 1. By hypothesis and the lemma, M(D) is negative deﬁnite on ρ⊥,a n d ρ has no
kernel because ρ1 =[ p] has none. So by Equivalence 1 (I’) holds for S,m,c u ˜ H(D)−1. Obviously M(D)
satisﬁes (II), so by Equivalence 2 (II’) holds, with −YW0 = I redundant since ρ2 = −W has linearly
independent rows. Lastly, by Equivalence 3 (III’) holds. That is, (Slutsky list) = (I’, II’, III’) holds.
Conversely, if (Slutsky list) = (I’, II’, III’) holds, then we apply the converse part of the Equivalences.
By Equivalence (1) (Smc)=(1’) is invertible, and the symmetric M appearing in (1) must by Equivalence
2b e M = M(D) for some (necessarily symmetric) D (recall Y ρ0
2 = I is redundant), and by Equivalence
(3) D must satisfy (III).
6.2 Equivalence lemmas
Equivalence 1
Proof. Invertibility: Suppose [x0,y0]0 is in the kernel of (1). Then Mx− ρy =0 and ρ0x =0⇒
x0Mx=0 and x ∈ ρ⊥ ⇒ x =0⇒ ρy =0⇒ y =0 since ρ has no kernel, hence (1) is invertible. Since
(1) is symmetric, so is its inverse, making S,c symmetric. By deﬁnition of inverse,
MS+ ρm0 = I −Mm+ ρc =0
ρ0S =0 ρ0m = I

























Ma− ρb = γ
ρ0a =0
which is possible by invertibility. Then
γ0Sγ =
(a0M − b0ρ0)Sγ = a0MSγ = a0(I − ρm0)γ =
a0γ = a0(Ma− ρb)=a0Ma
Since a ∈ ρ⊥,b yh y p o t h e s i so n M γ0Sγ = a0Ma<0 unless a =0⇒− ρb = γ or γ ∈ spanρ.S o i fγ
∈ ρ⊥,t h e n γ =0 .T h a t i s , S is negative deﬁnite on ρ⊥.
Conversely, suppose (I’). Then the invertibility of (1’) is established similarly as above. Since (1’) is








for some symmetric M,β. Claim: α = ρ,β =0 .B y d e ﬁnition of inverse, MS + αm0 = I and
α0S + βm0 =0 ; postmultiplying by ρ and invoking (I’) establishes the claim.c Clearly ρ0m = I implies

























Sa− mb = γ
m0a + cb =0
and suppose γ ∈ ρ⊥ ≡ 0=ρ0(Sa − mb)=−b.T h a t i s , Sa = γ and m0a =0 .S i n c e Mγ =
MSa =( I − ρm0)a = a,γ0Mγ = a0Sa.I n v o k i n g ( I ’ ) , w e s e e γ0Mγ < 0 unless a = ρα for some
α ⇒ 0=m0a = m0ρα = α ⇒ a =0⇒ γ = Sa =0 . Hence M is negative deﬁnite on ρ⊥.
Equivalence 2










21Focusing on the bottom part of MS+ ρm0 = I,
0+ρ2m0 =[ 0:I]
which says Xρ2 =0 ,Yρ2 = I.A s f o rcρ0
2 =0 :U s i n g−Mm+ ρc =0 , 0=M[0 : I]0 = Mmρ0
2 = ρcρ0
2.
Since ρ has no kernel, cρ0
2 =0 .












This and the symmetry of M imply that M is zero oﬀ the northwestern corner.
Lastly, I = ρ0m = ρ0
1X + ρ0
2Y ,s o Xρ0




2(I − Y ρ0
2)=0 .I fρ2 has
linearly independent rows, I − Y ρ0
2 =0 .
Equivalence 3
Expressing H−1 as in (*), by deﬁnition of inverse we have:
⎡




−X0 −Y 0 −c
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎡


















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
AD + Xρ0
1 = IX ρ0
2 =0 Aρ1 + Pρ2 =0
P0D + Y ρ0
1 =0 Y ρ0
2 = IP 0ρ1 + Bρ2 =0
−X0D + cρ0
1 =0 cρ0
2 =0 X0ρ1 + Y 0ρ2 = I
Lemma 3 Every z ∈ RC∗
can be expressed as z = Aa + Xb for some a ∈ X⊥,b∈ kerX⊥.
Proof. Set b = ρ0
1z,a = Dz − ρ1cb.T h e n Aa + Xb = A(Dz − ρ1cb)+Xb =( AD)z − (Aρ1)cb + Xb =
(I − Xρ0
1)z − (−Pρ2)cb + Xb = z − X(ρ0
1z − b)+P(ρ2c)b = z since from the equations ρ2c =0 .N o w
a ∈ X⊥ : X0a = X0(Dz − ρ1cb)=cρ0
1z − (I − Y 0ρ2)cb = c(ρ0
1z − b)=0 . To get b ∈ kerX⊥,r e d e ﬁne
b =( ρ0
1z)∗ where "∗" denotes the orthogonal projection to kerX⊥,b u tk e e p a as before.
Lemma 4 If Sρ =0 ,S is negative deﬁnite on ρ⊥, symmetric, then A is negative deﬁnite on X⊥.







⎦ = x + y ∈ ρ⊥ + spanρ
Since ρ0S =0 ,Sρ =0 ,









By hypothesis on S, a0Aa < 0 unless x =0⇒ [a0 :0 ] 0 = y = ργ some γ ⇒ 0=ρ2γ.I fa ∈ X⊥ then
0=X0a = X0ρ1γ =( I − Y 0ρ2)γ = γ ⇒ y =0⇒ a =0 .T h a t i s ,A is negative deﬁnite on X⊥.
Proof. of Equivalence 3. Suppose throughout ρ2µ =0 . We will appeal twice to the string
(Xδ)0(ρ1µ)=δ
0(X0ρ1)µ = δ
0(I − Y 0ρ2)µ = δ
0µ (string)
The third row implies X0DX = c: X0DX = cρ0
1X = c(I − ρ0
2Y )=c.F o r e v e r y δ, δ
0cδ =
(Xδ)0D(Xδ)=∗,a n d Xδ ∈ (ρ1µ)⊥ if δ ∈ µ⊥ by the (string), so ∗ < 0 by hypothesis on D, unless
Xδ =0 or δ ∈ kerX.I fδ ∈ kerX⊥ then δ =0 .T h a t i s ,c is negative deﬁnite on δ ∈ kerX⊥ ∩ µ⊥.
Conversely, ﬁx z ∈ RC∗
and by lemma 3 write z = Aa + Xb with a ∈ X⊥,b ∈ kerX⊥. Claim:
z0Dz = a0Aa+b0cb. Dz = D(Aa+Xb)=( I−ρ1X0)a+ρ1cb = a+ρ1cb.T h u sz0Dz =( a0A+b0X0)(a+ρ1cb)=
a0Aa + a0Aρ1cb + b0X0a + b0X0ρ1cb = ∗. The second term is zero, since the equations say Aρ1c = −Pρ2c
and ρ2c =0 , and so is the third one, since X0a =0 .S o∗ = a0Aa + b0(I − Y 0ρ2)cb = a0Aa + b0cb.c
By lemma 4 and a ∈ X⊥,a 0Aa < 0 unless a =0 .B y h y p o t h e s i s o nc and b ∈ kerX⊥,b 0cb < 0 unless
b =0 —so long as b ∈ µ⊥. S ot os h o w D is negative deﬁnite on (ρ1µ)⊥,i ts u ﬃces that z ∈ (ρ1µ)⊥ ⇔ b ∈
µ⊥. To see this implication, we take the particular b =( ρ0
1z)∗ from the proof of lemma 3, and apply
(string) twice, with δ = ρ0
1z and ˜ δ = b: z0ρ1µ = δ
0µ =( Xδ)0(ρ1µ)=( Xb)0(ρ1µ)=b0µ (the deﬁnition of
b ⇒ δ − b ∈ kerX ⇒ Xδ = Xb).
6.3 Quadratic perturbations
Proof. of proposition 3. Assuming that u(ω,∆) is also in Debreu’s setting, the remainder is easy:
23Given its interiority, x is the u−neoclassical demand at (p,W,w) iﬀ (F) holds at x and u iﬀ (F) holds
at x and u(ω,∆) iﬀ x is the u(ω,∆)−neoclassical demand at (p,W,w).T h e ﬁrst and last equivalences
hold because u,u(ω,∆) belong in Debreu’s setting, and the middle one because Du(x)=Du(ω,∆)(x).
Last but not least, ω ≡ 1 in a neighborhood x ≈ x,w h e r e u(ω,∆t)(x) ≡ u(x)+1
2(x − x)0∆t(x − x)
and D2u(ω,∆)(x)=D2u(x)+1
2(∆ + ∆0)t = D2u(x)+∆t, the last equality by ∆0s symmetry.
To verify for u(ω,∆) the four conditions in Debreu’s setting, ﬁx ω and write K ≡ support(ω).
(i) Obvious.
(ii, iii) These hold with the proviso x ∈ RC∗
++\K,s i n c eRC∗
++\K is open and u(ω,∆) |RC∗
++\K= u |RC∗
++\K,
so we turn to x ∈ K.B o t hsupK
° °Du(ω,∆)(x) − Du(x)
° °,supK
° °D2u(ω,∆)(x) − D2u(x)
° ° are bounded since
Du(ω,∆)(x),D2u(ω,∆)(x) are continuous in x and K compact, and homogeneous of degree one in t, hence
may be chosen smaller than any given δ > 0 by replacing ∆ with ∆t for all small enough t>0.
Choosing δ small enough to make true the implications
° °Du(ω,∆)(x) − Du(x)
° ° < δ ⇒ Du(ω,∆)(x) À
0,
° °D2u(ω,∆)(x) − D2u(x)
° ° < δ ⇒ D2u(ω,∆)(x) is negative deﬁnite on Du(x)⊥ (appealing to lemma 1 with
D(x) ≡ D2u(ω,∆)(x),σ(x) ≡ Du(x)⊥), these conditions also hold at x ∈ K.
(iv) This holds with the proviso x ∈ RC∗
++\K since u(ω,∆) |RC∗
++\K= u |RC∗
++\K,s ow et u r nt o x ∈ K.
Write ² ≡ u(x) − sup∂RC∗
+ u. Condition (iv) states ²>0. Now suppose that K is small enough (possible
by u0s continuity), in that |u(x) − u(x)| < ²
2 for x ∈ K, and that the rescaling of ∆ is too, in that
|(x − x)0∆(x − x)| <² for x ∈ K.T h e n f o r x ∈ Ku (ω,∆)(x)=u(x)+
ω(x)




2 (−²) ≥ u(x) − ² =s u p ∂RC∗
+ u =s u p ∂RC∗
+ u(ω,∆), the latter since u = u(ω,∆) on ∂RC
∗
+ c
6.4 Computation of Slutsky matrices
As in the proof of Equivalence 3, but substituting ρ1 =[ p],ρ2 = −W,
AD + X[p]0 = IX W 0 =0 A[p] − PW =0
P0D + Y [p]0 =0 −YW0 = IP 0[p] − BW =0
−X0D + c[p]0 =0 cW0 =0 X0[p] − Y 0W = I
(system)
Proof. of algorithm 1. Invertibility is easy. We deduce formulas for A,B,c,P,X,Y recursively, while
imposing A,B,c0s symmetry, which we verify last, and refer to equation ij as that appearing in row i,
24column j of the (system). Note Φ ≡ [p]0D−1[p] is symmetric, negative deﬁnite since [p] has no kernel.
Equation 21 holds iﬀ P ≡− D−1[p]Y 0;e q u a t i o n 31 iﬀ X ≡ D−1[p]c;e q u a t i o n 11 iﬀ A ≡
[(I −X[p]0)D−1]0.W i t h t h i s d e ﬁnition of X, 12 holds if 32 holds. So far P,X,A are in terms of Y,c,
which we describe in terms of B.
Given this formula for P, 23 holds iﬀ −Y Φ − BW =0 iﬀ Y ≡− BWΦ−1. Given the formulas for
X,Y, 33 holds iﬀ cΦ + Φ−1W0BW = I iﬀ c ≡ Φ−1 − Φ−1W0BWΦ−1.
Claim: A,P as deﬁned make 13 true. A[p] − PW = D−1(I −[p]X0)[p]+D−1[p]Y 0W = ∗.S i n c e33
holds by deﬁnition of c, ∗ = D−1(I − [p]X0)[p]+D−1[p](X0[p] − I)=0 .
Now deﬁne B ≡ (WΦ−1W0)−1.N o t e ,WΦ−1W0 is invertible if negative deﬁnite, which it is since Φ−1
is (as the inverse of a negative deﬁnite matrix) and W0 has no kernel.
Claim: B as deﬁned makes 22,32 true. 22: −YW0 = BWΦ−1W0 = I. 32: cW 0 =( Φ−1 −
Φ−1W0BWΦ−1)W0 = Φ−1W0(I − B · WΦ−1W0)=Φ−1W0(0) = 0.
These deﬁnitions solve the system modulo A,B,c0s symmetry, which does exist: B is symmetric
indeed, which implies c is, which implies A = D−1(I − [p]X0)=D−1 − D−1[p]c[p]0D−1 is.
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